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Financial Market Implications
of the Federal Debt Paydown
THE UNITED STATES achieved its third consecutive federal budget sur-
plus—a record $237 billion—in fiscal 2000.
1 This string of surpluses has
allowed the Treasury Department to begin to pay off the national debt.
After more than tripling from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, outstand-
ing marketable U.S. Treasury securities fell from just under $3.5 trillion in
March 1998 to $3.0 trillion in July 2000. The Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) projects that the surpluses will continue, causing the debt
held by the public to be fully redeemed by 2012.
2
Although a remarkable achievement, the paydown of the debt also
raises some concerns. U.S. Treasury securities play a central role in the
implementation of monetary policy and in the efficient working of finan-
cial markets more broadly. By reducing and possibly someday eliminat-
ing the stock of these securities, the debt paydown raises questions about
how monetary policy will be conducted in the future and how financial
markets will adapt to the diminished supply of this key instrument. The
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1. U.S. Treasury, “Monthly Treasury Statement,” September 2000.
2. Ofﬁce of Management and Budget, “Mid-Session Review,” June 26, 2000. Debt held
by the public includes both marketable and nonmarketable securities and totaled $3.4 tril-
lion as of July 31, 2000. It excludes debt securities held as assets by U.S. government
accounts ($2.2 trillion as of July 31, 2000) but includes Federal Reserve holdings.
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the striking inversion of the Treasury yield curve this year have heightened
interest in these questions and spurred discussion as to which assets might
be suitable Treasury substitutes.
Treasury securities play several critical roles in financial markets.
Because these securities are considered free from default risk and are
highly liquid across a wide range of issues, their yields are used as a proxy
for risk-free interest rates. These properties, together with the presence of
well-developed derivatives markets in which investors can sell Treasuries
short, make them a useful reference benchmark and hedging instrument
for other ﬁxed-income securities. Their creditworthiness and liquidity also
make Treasury securities a popular reserve asset for numerous financial
institutions and the primary asset of the Federal Reserve.
Some of the very features that make Treasury securities an attractive
benchmark and reserve asset are likely to be adversely affected by the debt
paydown. In fact, recent events suggest that the reduced supply of Trea-
suries may already be disrupting the market and that more such disruptions
may be in the offing. In February 2000, for example, the Treasury
announced that its one-year bill would henceforth be issued only every
thirteen weeks rather than every four weeks. As the last bill auctioned on
the old cycle aged, the bill became very expensive to borrow in the mar-
ket for repurchase agreements (repos). On May 31, for instance, dealers
had to lend out funds at a very low2.25 percent annual rate in order to
secure the one-year bill as collateral. The liquidity of the issue in the cash
market also suffered, with bid-ask spreads widening and trading volume
plunging. At the same time, the issue became extremely expensive rela-
tive to other Treasuries of similar maturity.
With the debt paydown under way, market participants are already mov-
ing away from Treasury securities as a reference benchmark and hedging
device and toward the debt securities of government-sponsored enterprises
(such as Fannie Mae) and state-chartered corporations, and toward interest
rate swaps.
3 These other instruments are liquid (although not as liquid as
Treasuries), the debt securities can be borrowed in reasonably active repo
markets, and a futures market was recently introduced for agency securi-
ties (and is being discussed for corporate securities). Furthermore, the
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3. The benchmark uses of Treasury securities, the implications of the federal debt pay-
down, and the viability of alternative benchmarks are also discussed in Fleming (2000a).
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hedging vehicles than Treasuries, because it can result in them trading at
prices that track more closely those of other fixed-income securities that
also have credit risk. Agency securities and swaps, in particular, are
increasingly used to hedge positions, price new securities, and evaluate
existing securities in U.S. ﬁxed-income markets.
The Federal Reserve System has meanwhile taken several measures to
adapt its conduct of monetary policy to the debt paydown. At its March
2000 meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) endorsed a
“broad-gauge” study of the issues associated with changes in the system’s
asset allocation.
4 It also disclosed that, until that study’s completion, the
Fed could rely on temporary operations to meet reserve needs that could
not comfortably be met with outright purchases of Treasuries. In fact, the
Fed already relies on short-term repos and matched sale-purchase trans-
actions rather than outright purchases and sales of Treasury securities to
temporarily add and drain reserves. A declining stock of Treasuries should
therefore not cause problems for the implementation of monetary policy.
It is possible, of course, that the projections of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget will prove inaccurate. Slower-than-expected growth,
higher-than-expected spending, or lower-than-expected revenues could
lead to significantly smaller surpluses and a correspondingly slower pay-
down of the debt. Alan Auerbach and William Gale, for example, are much
less optimistic about the future surpluses.
5 Congressional Budget Office
projections are more optimistic but assume that some debt will remain out-
standing, even if the projected surpluses materialize, since longer-term
securities will not be available for redemption.
6
Even in the absence of funding needs, the government could still choose
to issue Treasury securities and use the proceeds to accumulate private sec-
tor assets. The government would benefit from low funding costs even as
it met market demand for safe and liquid securities, and it would be help-
ing to maintain the infrastructure of the Treasury market for a possible
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4. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, “Minutes of the Federal Open Market
Committee: March 21, 2000” (www.bog.frb.fed.us/fomc/MINUTES/20000321.HTM).
5. Auerbach and Gale (2000).
6. Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (2000).
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allowing Social Security funds to be invested in non-Treasury instruments,
as has been proposed, or it could be implemented through another gov-
ernment entity.
7 Such a policy has its drawbacks, however, for it means
that the government would be allocating credit, assuming credit risk, and
potentially inﬂuencing the institutions in which it invested.
Despite the uncertainties about the magnitude of the debt paydown, it
remains likely that much of the outstanding marketable Treasury debt
will be paid off over the next decade. Even if the projected surpluses do not
fully materialize, the stock of marketable Treasuries has already fallen sig-
nificantly, and it is on a steep downward trajectory that is unlikely to be
reversed quickly. Moreover, the evidence cited above, and explored in
greater detail in the rest of this paper, suggests that the Treasury market has
already been affected by the paydown, that market participants are moving
away from Treasuries as a hedging and reference benchmark, and that the
Fed is taking steps to adjust its portfolio in expectations of a further
paydown.
U.S. Treasury Securities as a Benchmark and Reserve Asset
Treasury bills, notes, and bonds are issued by the federal government to
ﬁnance budget shortfalls, the redemption of maturing securities, and short-
term cash management needs.
8 Treasury bills have original maturities of
one year or less. They pay no interest between issuance and maturity but
are instead issued and traded at a discount to their face value. Treasury
notes have original maturities of more than one but not more than ten
years, and Treasury bonds have original maturities of more than ten years.
Notes and bonds (coupon securities) are issued with a stated rate of inter-
est and make coupon payments every six months.
A number of features contribute to the prominence of Treasury securi-
ties in financial markets. Treasury securities are backed by the full faith
and credit of the U.S. government and are therefore considered free of
224 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
7. U.S. General Accounting Ofﬁce (1998) examines the implications of investing Social
Security funds in the stock market.
8. For a more detailed introduction to the Treasury securities market see Dupont and
Sack (1999) and Fabozzi and Fleming (2000).
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rities have fostered an extremely liquid, round-the-clock secondary market
with extremely active trading and narrow bid-ask spreads.
9 In the ﬁrst six
months of 2000, for example, daily trading activity reported by the pri-
mary government securities dealers averaged $207 billion per day.
10 Trea-
suries also trade in a very active repo market in which dealers can borrow
securities and ﬁnance their positions, as well as in an active futures market
in which dealers can buy and sell securities for future delivery.
11
Because Treasuries are considered free of default risk, their yields rep-
resent risk-free rates of return. These risk-free rates are used in a variety of
analytical applications, including the forecasting of interest rates, inﬂation,
and economic activity. Arturo Estrella and Frederic Mishkin, for exam-
ple, show that the yield spread between the three-month Treasury bill and
the ten-year Treasury note is valuable in predicting recessions.
12 Treasury
yields are also used as a risk-free benchmark in the analysis of other ﬁxed-
income and non-ﬁxed-income markets. In estimating the capital asset pric-
ing model, for example, the rate on a Treasury billis typically used as a
proxy for the risk-free rate.
In addition to their creditworthiness, the liquidity of Treasury securi-
ties across a wide range of issues is important to their use as a risk-free
benchmark. In an illiquid market, bid-ask bounce or temporary order
imbalances can cause significant price moves. The liquidity of the Trea-
sury market, in contrast, ensures that observed prices remain close to the
market consensus of where prices should be, and that changes in prices
reflect revisions in that consensus, not random noise. Similarly, in a less
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9. Fleming (1997) describes the round-the-clock market, and Fleming (2000b) analyzes
trading activity, bid-ask spreads, and other measures of Treasury market liquidity. 
10. Federal Reserve Bank of New York (www.ny.frb.org/pihome/statistics/msytd.00).
Primary dealers are firms with which the Federal Reserve Bank of New York interacts
directly in the course of its open market operations. Because trading volume data are col-
lected from all of the primary dealers but from no other entities, trades between primary
dealers are counted twice, and trades between nonprimary dealers are not counted at all.
11. In a repo, a party agrees to exchange collateral for cash and, at the same time, to
buy back that collateral at a specified price at some point in the future. A dealer owning a
particular Treasury note, for example, might agree to sell that security to another dealer
and to buy it back the next day. The first dealer can thus use the repo market to finance its
positions, often at a favorable rate, and the second dealer can use the same market to borrow
and then sell securities it does not hold in its portfolio. For a further introduction to repos,
see Dufﬁe (1996) and Jordan and Jordan (1997).
12. Estrella and Mishkin (1998).
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different prices. However, liquidity across Treasury issues, facilitated by
the futures, repo, and zero-coupon markets, helps ensure that Treasury
securities with similar cash ﬂows trade at similar prices, and that prices are
only minimally affected by issue-specific differences in liquidity, supply,
or demand.
13
Treasury securities are also used extensively as a reference benchmark
and hedging instrument for other dollar-denominated ﬁxed-income securi-
ties. An estimated $500 billion in adjustable-rate mortgages, for example,
is referenced against the Treasury’s one-year constant-maturity rate.
14 Sim-
ilarly, when a fixed-rate corporate debt issue is initially sold, it is typi-
cally marketed in terms of a yield spread to a particular Treasury security
rather than at an absolute yield or price.
15 Treasuries are also used as a
hedge to manage investors’ interest rate exposure. A dealer might, for
example, sell Treasuries at the same time that it agrees to buy a block of
agency securities from one of its customers, and then buy back the Trea-
suries as the agency securities are sold off. In this way the dealer’s expo-
sure to changes in interest rates that are common to both Treasuries and
agency securities is eliminated. This ability to hedge in the Treasury mar-
ket increases dealers’willingness to make markets and take positions in
other markets and thereby improves the liquidity of these other markets.
To serve as an attractive reference benchmark, Treasury yields should
tend to change in line with those of other securities. In bringing a new
226 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
13. Zero-coupon securities are created from existing Treasury notes by separating, or
stripping, the coupon payments both from the principal and from one another into individ-
ual securities. The Treasury’s STRIPS (Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Princi-
pal Securities) program, introduced in February 1985, facilitates stripping and reconstitution
and thereby improves market liquidity. For a recent analysis of Treasury market integra-
tion, see Bennett, Garbade, and Kambhu (2000). 
14. Sarah Landis, “Adjustable-Rate Mortgages Face Effect of the Elimination of One-
Year Bills,” Wall Street Journal, August 14, 2000. The one-year constant-maturity rate is
interpolated from the daily yield curve based on market quotations obtained from the Fed.
Additional detail on the series is available at www.bog.frb.fed.us/releases/H15/update/.
15. In contrast, floating-rate issues are typically marketed and priced relative to the Lon-
don interbank offer rate, the short-term rate charged among banks in the Eurodollar mar-
ket. An August 1999 issue of DaimlerChrysler AG, for example, had a three-year floating-
rate portion marketed relative to the London interbank offer rate (LIBOR) along with
ﬁve-year and ten-year ﬁxed-rate portions marketed relative to comparable Treasuries (Greg-
ory Zuckerman, “Under Boom Economy, Strain over Debt,” Wall Street Journal,August 18,
1999, p. C1).
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because changes in Treasury yields are correlated with changes in cor-
porate yields. The liquidity of the Treasury market, the rarity of large,
idiosyncratic changes in Treasury prices, and the fact that much of a
fixed-income security’s interest rate exposure is common with that of a
Treasury security of comparable maturity have historically made Trea-
suries a popular reference benchmark. The simplicity and familiarity of
Treasury securities undoubtedly contributes to this popularity.
For Treasury securities to serve as an attractive hedging instrument, cor-
relation of yields is again important, but so are liquidity and the existence
of active repo and futures markets. By definition, a hedge should reduce
one’s interest rate exposure to a position by providing a return that is
highly and negatively correlated with the original position’s return. Market
liquidity is also essential, as hedgers must be able to quickly buy and sell
large positions with minimal transactions costs. As hedging frequently
involves taking short positions, the ability to borrow securities at low cost
in the repo market or to sell securities for future delivery in the futures
market is also necessary.
The creditworthiness and liquidity of Treasury securities have also
made them central to the implementation of monetary policy. To maintain
the federal funds rate around its target level, the Fed adjusts reserve bal-
ances through open market operations. “Permanent” additions to reserves
are conducted through secondary market purchases of Treasury securi-
ties; these purchases totaled $45 billion (at par value) in 1999 alone.
16 As
of August 2, 2000, Federal Reserve banks held $524 billion in Treasury
securities, or 17 percent of marketable Treasuries outstanding.
17 “Tempo-
rary” additions to reserves are conducted through intervention in the repo
market. In these operations the Fed effectively lends funds for a period of
one to ninety days while accepting Treasury securities, agency debt secu-
rities, or mortgage-backedsecurities as collateral. To temporarily drain
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16. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Domestic Open Market Operations during
1999” (www.ny.frb.org/pihome/annual.html). These operations are termed “permanent”
because they are intended to address permanent changes in the supply of or demand for
balances at the Fed and because they permanently affect the size of the Fed’s System Open
Market Account. “Temporary” operations, in contrast, are used to address shorter-term
movements in the supply of or demand for balances.
17. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “System Open Market Account Holdings”
(www.ny.frb.org/pihome/statistics/); these data exclude the effects of sales under matched
sale-purchase transactions.
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it effectively borrows funds for one to ninety days while providing Trea-
sury bills as collateral.
This same creditworthiness and liquidity also make Treasuries a popu-
lar reserve asset for other ﬁnancial institutions. As of August 2, 2000, for-
eign official and international accounts at Federal Reserve banks held
$615 billion in Treasury securities, or about 20 percent of marketable Trea-
sury securities outstanding.
18 These institutions’willingness to hold assets
in U.S. dollars rests at least partly on their ability to invest in safe and liq-
uid Treasuries. Likewise, domestic depository institutions held $235 billion
in Treasuries, or 8 percent of marketable Treasury securities outstanding, as
of March 31, 2000.
19 Holding safe and liquid assets like Treasury securities
gives these institutions the ability to meet their customers’unexpected liq-
uidity needs by quickly selling such assets, if necessary.
20
Implications of the Debt Paydown for the Behavior of the
Treasury Securities Market
Because only a small fraction of the federal debt turns over each year,
what might appear as a modest paydown to date has already resulted in
substantial reductions in new issuance of Treasury securities. Issuance
sizes have been reduced (for example, those of bills in March 1997),
issuance frequencies have been reduced (for example, that of the five-
year note in 1998), and some issues have been eliminated altogether (for
example, the three-year note in 1998).
21 Treasury bill issuance through
228 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
18. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, “Federal Reserve Statistical Release
H.4.1, Factors Affecting Reserve Balances” (www.bog.frb.fed.us/releases/H41/). Foreign
investors in the aggregate held $1.2 trillion in Treasury securities as of June 30, 2000, or
40 percent of marketable Treasury securities outstanding on that date (Treasury Bulletin,
September 2000, pp. 23 and 47).
19. Treasury Bulletin, September 2000, p. 47.
20. Saidenberg and Strahan (1999) discuss this “buffer stock” approach to providing
liquidity in their analysis of bank lending during the ﬁnancial market turmoil of fall 1998.
21. Signiﬁcant debt management changes are typically announced at the Treasury’s quar-
terly refunding press conferences. The press releases for such conferences are posted at
www.treas.gov/press/releases. Also see Dupont and Sack (1999), U.S. General Accounting
Ofﬁce (1999), and Bennett, Garbade, and Kambhu (2000) for a discussion of recent changes
in Treasury debt management.
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the comparable months of 1996.
22 Issuance of Treasury coupon securities
fell a much sharper 49 percent over the same period, from $375 billion to
$190 billion.
To maintain large issue sizes and the liquidity of the on-the-run securities,
the Treasury announced a revision to its original issue discount rules in
November 1999 and launched a debt buyback programin January 2000.
23
The rule changes allow the Treasury to reopen its most recent issues within
one year of issuance without concern that the price of those issues may
have fallen by more than a small amount. As a result, the Treasury was able
to announce in February 2000 that every other auction of its ﬁve-, ten-, and
thirty-year securities would be a reopening of the previous auction. Under
the debt buyback program, the Treasury redeems its outstanding un-
matured securities by purchasing them in the secondary market through a
reverse auction. By buying back off-the-run securities, the Treasury is able
to maintain large issue sizes for new securities.
One implication of the reduced issuance of Treasuries is that the cost
of borrowing these securities in the repo market may increase. The recent
behavior of the one-year Treasury bill is instructive. As already noted,
at its February 2000 quarterly refunding the Treasury announced that
new issuance of the one-year bill would be reduced from every four
weeks to every thirteen weeks. The one-year bill auctioned on February 29
(and maturing March 1, 2001) was the last sold on the old cycle and
thus the first to remain on the run for thirteen weeks instead of four.
The issue size of the bill, at $10 billion, was unchanged from that of its
predecessors.
24
In late April 2000 the cost of borrowing the March 1, 2001, bill became
strikingly high. On April 30, for example, an investor had to lend funds at
a 4.00 percent annual rate to secure the one-year bill as collateral on an
overnight repo. The general Treasury collateral rate on the same day was
5.75 percent. In such a case, when an investor must lend funds at a rate
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22. Issuance ﬁgures are calculated using data available at the Bureau of the Public Debt’s
website (www.publicdebt.treas.gov/of/ofaicqry.htm).
23. “On-the-run” securities are the most recently issued securities of a given maturity.
Older securities of a given maturity are called “off-the-run.”
24. In contrast, when issuance of the ﬁve-year Treasury note was reduced from monthly
to quarterly in 1998, issue sizes were increased from $11 billion to $16 billion.
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to be “on special.” Figure 1 shows that this differential or “specialness” 
of the one-year bill reached 1.75 percent (175 basis points) on April 28
and peaked at 415 basis points on May 31. Shorter-term bills were also
on special over this period, although much less so than the one-year bill;
the specialness of the three-month bill peaked at 123 basis points on 
May 30, and that of the six-month bill at 35 basis points on May 3. The
sharp drop in specialness of the one-year bill on June 1 reflects the
crossover from the March 1, 2001, bill to the new one-year bill auctioned
the previous day.
Why did the one-year bill become so expensive to borrow? It is likely
that dealers who shorted the one-year bill when it was relatively new did
not anticipate how scarce and expensive the issue would become in the
repo market as it aged beyond four weeks. An analogy can be drawn
between this episode and what often happens with Treasury coupon secu-
rities. Issues become expensive to borrow when borrowing demand is high









Sep 1999 Nov 1999 Jan 2000 Mar 2000 May 2000 Jul 2000
Basis points
Source:  Author’s calculations based on data from GovPX.
a.  Overnight general collateral rate less the collateral rate for on-the-run bills. Daily data using 9:00 a.m. quotes.
March 1, 2001, bill auctioned
May 31, 2001, bill auctioned
Figure 1. Repurchase Agreement Market Specialness of the On-the-Run One-Year
Treasury Bill, July 1999–July 2000
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quently trade on special because coupon securities are often shorted for
hedging or speculative purposes and because on-the-run securities are the
most liquid. As on-the-run coupon securities age, they typically become
more expensive to borrow in the repo market as they are sold off by the
dealer community and their available supply decreases.
25
Despite this episode with the one-year bill, repo market borrowing costs
have not generally shown much of an increase in recent years. Table 1
reports the average level of specialness in each of the last few years for on-
the-run coupon securities of various maturities. It shows that specialness in
2000 (through July 31) is somewhat higher than usual for the two- and
five-year notes, but lower than usual for the ten-year note and the thirty-
year bond. The absence of a substantial increase in specialness in light of
reduced Treasury issuance may partly reflect reduced demand to borrow
Treasuries (as investors adopt substitutes), but it probably also reflects
the fact that the lendable supply of Treasuries has decreased less than the
issuance. This has happened because holders of Treasury securities, such
as the Fed, have become more willing to lend out speciﬁc issues from their
portfolios.
26 The Treasury’s steps toward more frequent reopening of
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25. Keane (1996) documents this pattern of repo rates over the auction cycle.
26. See Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Announcement of Revisions to the SOMA
Securities Lending Program,” February 12, 1999 (www.ny.frb.org/pihome/news/announce/
1999/soma.html).




Two-year note Five-year note Ten-year note Thirty-year bond
Standard Standard Standard  Standard 
Year Mean deviation Mean deviation Mean deviation Mean deviation
1997 28.3 38.3 63.0 70.4 132.6 118.2 65.4 95.2
1998 32.0 54.8 81.6 101.9 159.4 141.8 151.1 149.9
1999 33.6 48.5 79.7 91.5 180.7 153.7 118.2 120.9
2000
b 50.6 42.4 103.2 128.3 145.5 108.4 55.5 81.0
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from GovPX.
a. Difference between the overnight general collateral rate and the collateral rate on the indicated security (daily averages).
b. Through July 27.
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supply for a given issue.
Another likely implication of the projected debt paydown is a deterio-
ration in market liquidity. In fact, market participants are already raising
concerns about liquidity as the supply of marketable Treasuries has
declined.27Although data are insufﬁcient to allow an examination of many
measures of liquidity on a historical basis, average daily trading volume
data are available and are plotted by month for the past forty years in fig-
ure 2. Trading volume increased sharply between the mid-1970s and the
mid-1990s with the growth in federal debt, with the development of the
Treasury STRIPS market, and with the introduction and expansion of other
fixed-income markets such as the mortgage-backed securities market.
The peak in trading volume roughly corresponds with the March 1997
232 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
27. See, for example, “Liquidity Angst Grows in Treasury Market,” BondWeek, March
15, 1999, p. 1, and Gregory Zuckerman, “Pared Treasury Supply Poses Risks: Paying Off






1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997
Billions of 2000 dollars
b
Source:  Federal Reserve Bank of New York data; Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues.
a.  Monthly averages of daily trading volume (par value) as reported by the primary dealers. Trades between primary dealers are 
reported by both counterparties and are therefore double-counted.
b.  Adjusted for inflation using the implicit GDP deflator.   
Figure 2. Daily Trading Volume of Treasury Securities, 1961–2000
a
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ume, which corresponds to the decreased volume of securities outstanding,
is broadly consistent with other evidence that the market has become less
liquid.
Market liquidity can be assessed more precisely for recent years and has
shown a marked deterioration since 1998. Figure 3 plots the average
weekly bid-ask spreads of the on-the-run notes. Although spreads have
widened, suggesting a reduction in market liquidity, the role of reduced
Treasury issuance is not clear. Most of the sharp widenings in these
spreads are associated with equity market declines or general financial
market turmoil (such as that surrounding the near failure of Long-Term
Capital Management in September 1998). In February 2000, the spread
widenings seem to have been precipitated by debt management announce-
ments at the Treasury’s quarterly refunding press conference. Even in this
case, it is not easy to interpret the market’s response, since the announce-
ments pertained to future issue sizes and frequencies.
The behavior of the one-year bill is again instructive, as liquidity dete-
riorated markedly in this part of the market after the issuance frequency
of the bill was reduced. As ﬁgure 4 shows, bid-ask spreads for this security
increased sharply in May 2000, averaging over 1.5 basis points in late
May, higher than their peak in the fall of 1998. Furthermore, trading vol-
ume in the one-year bill plummeted in May 2000, as shown in figure 5.
Bid-ask spreads on shorter-term bills also widened sharply in May 2000,
but trading volume declined much more modestly for these securities. Sig-
niﬁcantly, trading volume remained low in the new one-year bill auctioned
in May 2000, suggesting that what transpired with the previous bill may
have long-lasting implications. Dealers who had taken short positions in
the previous bill, only to have difficulty covering them, were probably less
willing to take short positions in the new bill.
Decreased Treasury issuance may also cause some Treasury securities
to perform differently from others, and some segments of the Treasury
market to perform differently from other segments. Figure 6 plots the yield
spread between the thirty-year Treasury bond and the ten-year Treasury
note. The spread widened sharply amid the financial market turmoil of
the fall of 1998, as reported “flight-to-quality” flows caused yields on
shorter-term Treasuries to fall more than did longer-term yields. Later, in
early 2000, the launch of the debt buyback program and speculation that
Michael J. Fleming 233











Source:  Author’s calculations based on data from GovPX.
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Source:  Author’s calculations based on data from GovPX.




Figure 3. Bid-Ask Spreads of On-the-Run Treasury Notes by Maturity, 
1997–2000a
Figure 4. Bid-Ask Spreads of the On-the-Run One-Year Treasury Bill, 1997–2000a











Source:  Author’s calculations based on data from GovPX.












Source:  Author’s calculations based on data from Bloomberg.
a.  Data are weekly closes.
Figure 5. Daily Trading Volume of the On-the-Run One-Year Treasury Bill,
1997–2000a
Figure 6. Yield Spread between Thirty-Year and Ten-Year Treasury Securities,
1997–2000
a
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in the thirty-year yield relative to shorter-term yields.
28 Spreads between
on-the-run and off-the-run securities widened further at the same time.
29
J. Huston McCulloch has noted that these spreads can be so wide as to
imply negative forward rates.
30
Again, the behavior of the one-year bill is informative. Figure 7 plots
the yield of the coupon security with the maturity closest to one year less
the yield of the on-the-run one-year bill. The spread is positive for the
entire sample, reflecting the price premium (or yield discount) of bills ver-
sus coupon securities.
31 This premium increased sharply in late April and
May of 2000, at the same time that the one-year bill was on special in the
repo market, peaking at an average spread of 56 basis points in the week
ending May 26. The premium came down somewhat after the new one-
year bill was issued but remained quite high by historical standards, aver-
aging 43 basis points in the week ending July 28.
Finally, decreased Treasury issuance may also cause the whole Treasury
market to perform differently from other fixed-income markets as Trea-
suries become scarcer and thus relatively more valuable. Figure 8 plots
yield spreads between the ten-year Treasury note and three other types of
instrument: interest rate swaps, agency debt securities, and corporate debt
securities. After being relatively stable through much of the 1990s, spreads
widened signiﬁcantly in the fall of 1998 and again in early 2000. The coin-
cidence of part of the widening with the Treasury’s debt management
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28. The timing of the inversion on and around the days of debt management announce-
ments suggests that economic fundamentals are not the sole explanation. Two of several arti-
cles relating the debt management changes to the inversion include William Pesek, Jr.,
“It’s a Tale of Two Bond Markets: The 30-Year Treasury, and Everything Else,” Barron’s,
January 31, 2000, p. MW8, and Joshua Chaffin, “Search on to Replace the 30-Year Bond:
Most Bond Traders Have Turned to the 10-Year Note as the New Market Benchmark,”
Financial Times, May 19, 2000, p. v.
29. Spreads between on-the-run and off-the-run securities widened significantly during
the ﬁnancial market turmoil of fall 1998 (Bank for International Settlements, 1999; Fleming,
2000a, 2000b) and were already wider than usual before the debt management announcements.
30. Using February 17, 2000, data, McCulloch (2000) estimates that investors are pay-
ing the Treasury a 3.09 percent annual rate to hold their principal for the year and a quarter
between February 2029 and May 2030. He argues that this anomaly is not adequately
explained by differences in liquidity or expected specialness.
31. The yield differential between Treasury bills and coupon securities is examined by
Amihud and Mendelson (1991) and Kamara (1994).
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Figure 7. Yield Spread between Off-the-Run Treasury Coupon Securities and the 
On-the-Run One-Year Treasury Bill, 1997–2000a
Figure 8. Yield Spreads between Selected Non-Treasury Instruments and the
Ten-Year Treasury Note, 1991–2000
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the only explanation.
The increasingly disparate performance of Treasury securities is also
evident in table 2, which reports correlations among four-week yield
changes for the series plotted in figure 8. The top panel reports these
correlations from the beginning of the sample period (April 19, 1991)
through July 1998, the month preceding the financial market turmoil
related to the devaluation of the Russian ruble and the near failure of
Long-Term Capital Management. The bottom panel reports correlations
from then through the end of the sample period (July 28, 2000). The
yields for each of the three non-Treasury instruments correlate highest
with Treasuries for the first part of the sample period, and lowest with
Treasuries for the second part. As an example, the correlation between
agency securities and Treasuries is 0.978 in the first period, compared
with 0.975 between agency securities and swaps, but in the second period
the correlation between agency securities and Treasuries is only 0.942,
compared with 0.976 between agency securities and swaps. The increas-
ingly idiosyncratic behavior of the Treasury market, due to reduced Trea-
sury issuance, partially explains the breakdown in the correlations with
Treasuries.
32
In summary, the paydown of the federal debt could reasonably be
expected to affect the attributes that make Treasury securities an attrac-
tive benchmark, and in fact there is already evidence of market disruptions.
The cost of borrowing the one-year bill in the repo market increased
sharply after the issuance frequency of the bill was reduced. Furthermore,
the entire Treasury market is less liquid than it once was, although the
role of reduced Treasury supply in this development is not conclusive. In
addition, particular Treasury securities (such as the one-year bill matur-
ing March 1, 2001), certain parts of the market (such as that for thirty-year
bonds), and possibly even the entire Treasury market are showing signs
that the paydown is leading to increased scarcity value and increased idio-
syncratic behavior among Treasuries.
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32. The evidence from correlations is less compelling when the yield changes are mea-
sured over shorter intervals. This may reﬂect short-term idiosyncratic price behavior, or data
measurement problems for the non-Treasury instruments, or both.
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Benchmark Role of Treasury Securities
The expected paydown of the federal debt challenges Treasury securi-
ties’ benchmark role. In fact, recent changes in the market are already
forcing market participants to reassess how they use Treasury securities as
a benchmark and to start using other instruments in place of Treasuries.
Concerns with the reference and hedging roles of Treasuries, in particu-
lar, are attracting significant attention.
33 In contrast, relatively little atten-
tion has been paid to the implications of the paydown for Treasury
securities’ role as a proxy for risk-free rates. This may reflect the fact
that Treasuries remain free of default risk and quite liquid, and that the
market’s uses as a risk-free benchmark are less pressing to market par-
ticipants than its uses as a reference and hedging device.
Michael J. Fleming 239
33. See, for example, John M. Berry, “Treasuries’Vanishing Act; As U.S. Borrowing
Shrinks, Investors Big and Small Seek Safety Elsewhere,” Washington Post, July 30, 2000,
p. H1, and Simon Boughey, “Casting a Long Shadow: With Fewer Treasurys and Alternative
Benchmarks Uncertain, the Credit Markets Turn Chaotic,” Investment Dealers’Digest,
April 3, 2000, p. 16.
Table 2. Correlations of Changes in Yields among Fixed-Income Instruments,
1991–2000a
Instrument Treasury debt Agency debt Corporate debt Swaps
April 19, 1991, to July 31, 1998
Treasury debtb 1.000
Agency debtc 0.978 1.000
Corporate debtd 0.986 0.973 1.000
Swapse 0.993 0.975 0.981 1.000
July 31, 1998, to July 28, 2000
Treasury debt 1.000
Agency debt 0.942 1.000
Corporate debt 0.955 0.964 1.000
Swaps 0.940 0.976 0.964 1.000
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Bloomberg and Merrill Lynch.
a. Correlations of four-week changes in yields for the indicated period.
b. On-the-run ten-year Treasury note.
c. Bloomberg’s ten-year option-free agency securities index.
d. Merrill Lynch’s index of seven- to ten-year Aa/AA-rated corporate bonds.
e. Ten-year semiannual ﬁxed versus three-month LIBOR swap rate.
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much of the dissatisfaction with their reference and hedging roles. Changes
in the premium accruing to on-the-run Treasury securities lead to a diver-
gence in performance between these and other fixed-income securities,
making Treasuries a poorer hedge and their yield a poorer reference rate.
Reflecting this divergence, market participants have experimented with
using off-the-run Treasuries as references for bringing new corporate issues
to market.
34 Unfortunately, the same feature that may make off-the-run
Treasuries a better gauge of Treasury market performance, namely, their
relative lack of liquidity, also makes them more susceptible to idiosyncratic
price changes and thus a poor hedging vehicle.
Like the spread between on-the-run and off-the-run securities, the
seemingly idiosyncratic behavior of the thirty-year bond sector has led to
a divergence in performance between thirty-year Treasury bonds and other
thirty-year securities, making the Treasury bond a less effective reference
and hedging security. Underwriters bringing new corporate issues to mar-
ket have thus tried using ten-year Treasuries as references for thirty-year
corporate bonds.
35 However, the potential for changes in the slope of the
yield curve suggests that a ten-year Treasury is not a good benchmark for
this purpose.
In the short end of the market as well, the idiosyncratic behavior of the
one-year Treasury bill is having unintended consequences for that secu-
rity’s reference role. A Treasury market strategist quoted in the August
14, 2000, Wall Street Journal observed that “‘ Anyone who has a mortgage
referenced against the one-year CMT’ [constant-maturity Treasury] that
has reset in the past few months is paying 0.35 percentage point less ‘than
they would be without the scarcity of the year bill.’”
36 The Treasury indi-
cated at its May and August 2000 quarterly refunding press conferences
that, in consideration of the bill’s elimination, it will work with Congress
to revise other such provisionsthat reference the bill.
240 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
34. Gregory Zuckerman, “Quirk in Yields Is Making Bonds More Attractive,” Wall Street
Journal, February 2, 1999, p. C1.
35. Gregory Zuckerman and Sonoko Setaishi, “Treasury Prices Drop as Supply Con-
cerns Ease: Vodafone Finds Demand for $5.25 Billion Issue,” Wall Street Journal, Febru-
ary 8, 2000, p. C21.
36. Sarah Landis, “Adjustable-Rate Mortgages Face Effect of the Elimination of One-
Year Bills,” Wall Street Journal, August 14, 2000, quoting Michael Cloherty, a Treasury
strategist at Credit Suisse First Boston Corporation.
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Alternatives to Treasury securities are also being investigated and in
some cases adopted for reference and hedging purposes. Among the poten-
tial alternatives are agency debt securities, corporate debt securities, and
interest rate swaps. 
Agency Debt Securities
Agency securities are obligations of federal government agencies or
government-sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the
Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBanks), the farm credit banks, Sallie
Mae, and the Tennessee Valley Authority. These agencies issue debt secu-
rities to finance activities that are supported by public policy, including
home ownership, farming, and education. Their securities are typically not
backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government as Treasury
securities are, and therefore they trade with some credit risk. They are nev-
ertheless considered to be of high credit quality and receive the highest rat-
ings from the major rating agencies.
37
Seeking to capitalize on the reduction in Treasury supply and the mar-
ket’s interest in large, liquid issues, some agencies have introduced their
own benchmark debt issuance programs, starting with Fannie Mae’s
Benchmark Notes program in January 1998. These programs provide for
the regular issuance of large-sized, noncallable coupon securities in a
range of maturities, and thus mimic the Treasury’s issuance practices. As
table 3 shows, the most recent (as of July 31, 2000) benchmark coupon
issues of the three largest agencies have generally ranged from $2 billion
to $8 billion and are thus about one-fifth to two-thirds as large as compa-
rable Treasury issues.
The performance of agency securities relative to that of other fixed-
income securities suggests that they may be good reference and hedging
vehicles. As can be seen in ﬁgure 8 and table 2, yields on agency securities
tend to move closely with those of swaps and corporate bonds over long
periods. These co-movements suggest a credit risk component to interest
rates that is common to agency securities, swaps, and corporate securi-
Michael J. Fleming 241
37. For more detail on the agency debt securities market, see Fabozzi and Fleming
(2000).
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rities actually gives them the potential to be better reference and hedging
instruments than Treasuries, as it allows their performance to correlate
more closely with that of other securities. On the other hand, the presence
of credit risk also means that there is an idiosyncratic risk component to
agency securities. This is particularly relevant given the proposals to end
some of the privileges that the government-sponsored enterprises now
enjoy.
38
An active repo market in agency securities has developed, allowing
market participants to borrow these securities for hedging and trading pur-
poses. In addition, an active futures market has been developing quickly
since contracts started trading on the Chicago Board of Trade and the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange in March 2000. Agency securities often
trade on special in the repo market, although differences in repo market
specialness and liquidity have so far resulted in only minor valuation dif-
ferences. The relative unimportance of idiosyncratic factors in determining
242 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
38. See, for example, Michael Schroeder and Gregory Zuckerman, “Treasury Ofﬁcial’s
Warning Rocks Bond Market, Challenging Fannie Mae’s Goal to Be Benchmark,” Wall
Street Journal, March 23, 2000, p. C28, and Kathleen Day, “Greenspan Urges Review of
Fannie, Freddie Subsidies,” Washington Post, May 24, 2000, p. E3.




Fannie Mae  Freddie Mac  FHLBanks FHLBanks 
Issue maturity benchmark reference globalb tapc Treasuryd
Two-year 3.0 3.0 2.3e 10.0
Three-year 3.0 5.0 2.4e
Five-year 5.5 4.0 1.5e 12.0
Seven-year 4.0 0.5e
Ten-year 3.0 8.0e 1.0e 18.0e
Thirty-year 2.0 3.0e 10.0
Sources: Data from Bloomberg; Fannie Mae; Ofﬁce of Finance, Federal Home Loan Banks; Freddie Mac.
a. Issues are the most recent noncallable benchmark coupon issues as of July 31. Securities more than one year old are
excluded.
b. Issues under the global debt program are typically issued through one-time auctions, like the benchmark issues of other agen-
cies, whereas those under the tap program are reopened on an ongoing basis over a period of several months.
c. Listed FHLBanks tap issues are limited to those designated as on the run by the FHLBanks.
d. Excludes amounts issued to refund maturing securities of the Federal Reserve banks as well as amounts that Federal Reserve
banks bid for on behalf of foreign and international monetary authorities. 
e. Reopened after original issue.
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issues, shown in ﬁgure 9, is relatively smooth, particularly when compared
with the constant-maturity Treasury yield curve. However, increased
demand to borrow and trade agency benchmark issues could cause issue-
speciﬁc differences to become more important in the future.
The liquidity of agency securities does not yet match that of Treasury
securities. Daily trading in agency coupon securities by the primary gov-
ernment securities dealers averaged $17.5 billion through the first six
months of 2000, compared with $178.8 billion in Treasury coupon secu-
rities.
39 Bid-ask spreads for agency securities are roughly 
1⁄2 to 1 basis point
for on-the-run benchmark issues and 1 to 2 basis points for off-the-run
issues.
40 In contrast, bid-ask spreads for Treasury notes, plotted in fig-
ure 4 in price terms, are typically less than 
1⁄2 basis point in yield terms.
In summary, agency debt securities are increasingly used both as a ref-
erence benchmark and hedging instrument. The yields on the agencies’
benchmark securities are used as barometers of the agency market for
monitoring and analytical purposes, and new debt issues have been mar-
keted at yields stated relative to those on benchmark agency securities.
41
Agency securities are also actively used as hedging vehicles for both cor-
porate debt and mortgage-backed securities. Agency securities are likely to
assume an increasingly significant benchmark role, although their liquid-
ity is limited by the size of the market, and their credit risk is likely to
remain a concern.
Corporate Debt Securities
Some large corporations have recently increased the size and regular-
ity of their debt issues to meet investor demand for large, liquid issues.
Ford Motor Company, in particular, announced in June 1999 its Global
Landmark Securities (or GlobLS) program, modeled on the programs of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Under this program, Ford and its ﬁnancing
subsidiary Ford Motor Credit Company have stated that they will bring
offerings of at least $3 billion to market two to four times a year.
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39. Federal Reserve Bank of New York (www.ny.frb.org/pihome/statistics/msytd.00).
40. Fannie Mae, Funding Notes, Vol. 5, June 2000, p. 3.
41. In August 1999, for example, a new issue of the Private Export Funding Corporation
was marketed in terms of Fannie Mae’s benchmark ten-year note (Gregory Zuckerman and
John Montgomery, “Bonds Sustain Rally on Low Inflation, with Investors Expecting Low
Inﬂation and Restraint on Rates from Fed,” Wall Street Journal, August 26, 1999, p. C17).
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with those of agencies and swaps. Indexes of corporate debt do not nec-
essarily make good reference benchmarks, however (for one thing, most
areonly calculated once a day), and they cannot be used for hedging. Indi-
vidual issues, on the other hand, often carry significant credit risk, which
causes their performance to deviate sharply from that of other issues.
Ford’s latest ten-year GlobLS issue, for example, rose 25 basis points rel-
ative to Treasuries in August 2000 in the midst of the Bridgestone/Fire-
stone tire recalls, in a month when the spread between comparable corpo-
rate bonds and Treasuries widened only 13 basis points.
42
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42. The yield data are from Bloomberg, and the comparable corporate reference is Mer-
rill Lynch’s seven- to ten-year corporate Aa/AA index. The tire recalls are cited as a factor
in the widening spreads in Steven Vames, “Economic Data Help Push Treasurys Ahead,
But Some Worry That Market Can’t Rally More,” Wall Street Journal, September 1, 2000,
p. C15.
Figure 9. Yield Curves for Fannie Mae Benchmark Securities, Interest Rate 
Swaps, and Treasury Securities, July 31, 2000
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Although it is almost twice as large as the agency debt market, with debt
outstanding totaling $3.1 trillion on March 31, 2000, compared with
$1.6 trillion in agency securities, it is far more fragmented.
43 Corporate
issuers are simply not large enough to issue debt securities in the sizes
and with the frequency of the agencies or the Treasury. Ford, for exam-
ple, had debt outstanding of $155 billion on March 31, 2000, compared
with $558 billion for Fannie Mae, $535 billion for the FHLBanks, and
$378 billion for Freddie Mac.
44 Bid-ask spreads for Ford GlobLS are
reported to be 1 to 2 basis points, and those for smaller issues of similar
quality are reported to be 3 to 5 basis points.
45 The repo market for corpo-
rate issues is fairly active, but less so than those for agency securities or
Treasuries. There is no futures market for corporate issues, although such
a market is being considered.
46
Ford GlobLS and other large issues play a limited benchmark role in the
corporate debt market. Their yields are used as reference rates for moni-
toring the performance of that market and evaluating other outstanding
corporate debt securities. They are also used in the marketing of some new
corporate issues.
47 Hedging using corporate issues is also taking place,
but activity is less than that with agency securities and interest rate swaps.
As noted, fragmentation limits the corporate debt market’s liquidity and
thereby inhibits it from assuming a more signiﬁcant benchmark role.
Interest Rate Swaps
An interest rate swap is an agreement between two parties to exchange
one stream of interest payments for another. The most common type of
Michael J. Fleming 245
43. The corporate debt figure is from the Bond Market Association, and the agency
debt ﬁgure is from the September 2000 Federal Reserve Bulletin, p. A30.
44. Ford’s debt ﬁgure is from its earnings report for the quarter ending March 31, 2000,
and the agency debt ﬁgures are from the September 2000 Federal Reserve Bulletin, p. A30.
45. “Ford Credit Taps Demand for Big Issues with $5 Bln Global Note,” Bloomberg,
October 21, 1999.
46. Barbara Etzel, “Bond Market Assn. Forms Task Force to Study a Corporate Futures
Contract,” Investment Dealers’Digest, July 10, 2000, p. 3.
47. “Ford Reinforces Benchmark Status of GlobLS Programme,” Euroweek, March 10,
2000, p. 22. In this case, an outstanding Ford GlobLS issue was used to price a new Ford
GlobLS issue. Referencing another security from the same issuer is attractive when mar-
keting a new security, because both securities are likely to be similarly affected by firm-
speciﬁc as well as general credit market developments (that is, they are close substitutes).
9760-07  BPEA Fleming  12/21/2000 14:19  Page 245interest rate swap exchanges ﬁxed interest rate payments for ﬂoating inter-
est rate payments for a given principal amount and period of time. The
ﬂoating rate in such contracts is often based on the London interbank offer
rate (LIBOR).
Swap rates are quoted in terms of the ﬁxed rate that must be paid to con-
vert to floating. At the daily close on July 31, 2000, for example, the
quoted ten-year swap rate was 7.26 percent. This means that semiannual
ﬁxed interest payments for ten years at an annual rate of 7.26 percent could
be swapped for semiannual ﬂoating interest payments on the same princi-
pal amount for ten years based on three-month LIBOR. Swap rates are
often quoted relative to a Treasury security; thus the ten-year spread on
July 31 was quoted as 122 basis points (the 7.26 percent swap rate less
the 6.04 percent yield on the on-the-run ten-year Treasury note). Swap
rates exceed those on Treasuries mainly because the floating payments
are based on a rate that contains a premium for credit risk (LIBOR is a
Aa/AA rate).
Since they are based on a floating rate that embodies credit risk, swap
rates often change in line with yields on debt securities, as shown in fig-
ure 8 and table 2. Swaps therefore also have the potential to serve as a
better reference and hedging instrument than Treasuries. At the same time,
the counterparty credit risk in a swap contract is minimal. Although there
is some risk that that one’s counterparty in a swap will default on its end of
the agreement, dealers mitigate this risk by executing swaps out of credit-
enhanced subsidiaries and by structuring swaps so that they automati-
cally unwind if a party’s Aaa/AAA credit rating is lost.
The swaps market is very active, with narrow bid-ask spreads. A market
survey by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York found daily trading in
U.S. dollar interest rate swaps to average $22 billion in April 1998.
48 Bid-
ask spreads for active contracts are reported to be about 1 basis point.
Liquidity may be hindered somewhat by the lack of fungibility in swaps
contracts. A dealer who has engaged in a swaps contract and wants to
unwind it has to either go back to the original counterparty, who may not
246 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
48. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Foreign Exchange and Interest Rate Derivatives
Market Survey: Turnover in the United States,” September 29, 1998. Note that this is the
average notional principal amount on which parties agreed to exchange interest payments
rather than a measure of the value of securities traded.
9760-07  BPEA Fleming  12/21/2000 14:19  Page 246want to unwind, or find a third party to take the dealer’s side of the swap
who is also acceptable to the original counterparty.
The absence of an underlying fundamental asset is an advantage of the
swaps market. There is no supply limit on swaps contracts and no need to
borrow securities to go short, as an entity can enter into as many swaps
contracts as it wants. Specific-issue concerns are also mitigatedby the
nature of swaps. The ability to create swaps, combined with the fungible
nature of the underlying cash flows, prevents swaps with the same or
nearly the same cash flows from trading at widely different rates. These
features of swaps help explain why the swaps curve was fairly smooth on
July 31, 2000, as shown in ﬁgure 9.
Swaps are already actively used as references and in hedging. They are
used for evaluating the performance of other fixed-income markets, and
numerous new corporate and asset-backed securities have been marketed
off of swap rates.
49 Swap rates are also used as reference rates for fore-
casting the future path of LIBOR. Positions in the agency debt, corporate
debt, and mortgage-backed securities markets are all hedged using interest
rate swaps. Swaps are likely to assume an increasingly important bench-
mark role as the supply of Treasuries diminishes.
In summary, market participants are experimenting with and adopting
agency debt securities, corporate debt securities, and interest rate swaps as
references and as hedging instruments. Agency securities and swaps
appear to have the greatest potential. Agency securities are offered in large
and liquid issues, are structured in a manner similar to familiar Treasury
securities, and tend to perform similarly to other fixed-income securities
with credit risk. Swap rates are unaffected by supply considerations and
tend to move closely with yields of ﬁxed-income securities that have credit
risk, yet have minimal credit risk themselves. Treasuries remain the pre-
dominant benchmark, but these alternative markets are likely to assume
greater reference and hedging roles as the Treasury debt is paid down.
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49. See, for example, Gregory Zuckerman, “Treasurys Stumble as Some Investors Make
Move to Agency Securities on Hopeful U.S. Comments,” Wall Street Journal, April 12,
2000, p. C21, and Kara Scannell, “Ford Motor Credit Sells $4.5 Billion of Bonds, A Fur-
ther Sign of Revival in Corporate Issuance,” Wall Street Journal, June 8, 2000, p. C24.
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Changes in the Treasury market resulting from the paydown of the fed-
eral debt also present challenges for the implementation of monetary pol-
icy. Although the creditworthiness of Treasuries is not in question, the
desirability of these securities for use in the conduct of monetary policy
also rests on the market’s size and liquidity. The Fed must to be able to
quickly add reserves to or drain them from the economy. Market liquidity
allows the Fed to do so at minimal cost to itself and with minimal disrup-
tion to the market.
As noted earlier, Fed holdings amounted to 17 percent of marketable
Treasury securities as of August 2000. As the stock of these securities
declines, and as Fed holdings continue to increase, the share held by the
Fed is likely to increase rapidly. Assuming that the debt shrinks accord-
ing to the Congressional Budget Office’s July 2000 projections, that Fed
holdings grow at the same rate as they did between 1989 and 1999 (an
8.5 percent compound annual growth rate), and that nonmarketable debt
remains a constant 11.0 percent of the public debt, Fed holdings would
grow to 25 percent of the total in 2002, 50 percent in 2005, and close to
100 percent in 2007.
It is not clear at what level Fed holdings become unduly large relative
to the stock of Treasury securities outstanding. At the March 2000 FOMC
meeting, however, the manager of the Fed’s System Open Market
Account suggested limits of 35 to 40 percent for bill issues in order to
maintain a liquid portfolio.
50 At the same meeting, the FOMC endorsed
a study to consider alternative asset classes and selection criteria “in
light of declining Treasury debt.” Limits on system holdings ranging from
35 percent for bills down to 15 percent for longer-term coupon securities
were then announced in July 2000, in order to manage the liquidity and
average maturity of the Fed’s portfolio.
51 As noted in the announcement,
application of these limits has already constrained Fed purchases of Trea-
sury bills.
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50. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, “Minutes of the Federal Open Market
Committee: March 21, 2000” (www.bog.frb.fed.us/fomc/MINUTES/20000321.HTM).
51. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Announcement of Changes in the Manage-
ment of the System Open Market Account,” July 5, 2000 (www.ny.frb.org/pihome/news/
announce/2000/an000705.html).
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is paid down, it is important to reiterate that it is Fed practice to use tem-
porary operations to meet shorter-term changes in reserves. In 1999, for
example, the Fed arranged 244 repos (to add reserves) and 13 matched
sale-purchase transactions (to drain reserves).
52 The $15 billion average
value of repos outstanding in 1999 masks considerable variation across the
year. In particular, to address the unprecedented reserve needs at the turn
of the millennium, repos outstanding reached $141 billion on Decem-
ber 31, 1999. Large and rapid increases and subsequent decreases in
reserves have therefore been addressed through temporary operations.
The Fed could thus increasingly rely on short-term operations to meet
the expected growth in reserve needs with minimal disruption. In fact, the
minutes of the March 2000 FOMC meeting disclose that, pending com-
pletion of the Fed’s asset allocation study, the Fed could rely on tempo-
rary operations to meet the growth in reserves that could not easily be met
by additional outright purchases of Treasury securities. An increased
reliance on short-term operations would be facilitated by an expansion
of the pool of collateral eligible for use in repos. Temporary approval of
mortgage-backed securities as eligible collateral was given by the FOMC
at its August 1999 meeting and then extended at the March 2000 meet-
ing pending completion of the Fed’s study. The Fed indicated, however,
that the temporary extension of authority “should not be read as indicat-
ing in any way how the Committee might ultimately choose to allocate
the portfolio.”
The Fed could also diversify its permanent portfolio should the avail-
ability of Treasury securities decline as projected. The Federal Reserve
Act already allows the Fed to buy agency securities, certain municipal
securities, foreign exchange, and foreign sovereign debt. In fact, as 
of July 31, 2000, the Fed held $15.1 billion in foreign currency–
denominated securities and $140 million in agency debt securities.
53
Should it wish to, the Fed could seek authority, through technical changes
in the Federal Reserve Act, to transact in a broader range of assets. Other
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52. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Domestic Open Market Operations during
1999” (www.ny.frb.org/pihome/annual.html).
53. Federal Reserve Bulletin, October 2000, p. A10.
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portfolio need not be made up of highly liquid instruments for it to effec-
tively manage reserves.
Diversification of the Fed’s permanent portfolio does raise some con-
cerns, however. First, the Fed would inevitably be seen as favoring some
issuers over others, whatever its credit allocation decisions, and there is
a risk that those decisions could be seen as an endorsement of those
issuers. Second, the Fed would likely be assuming a greater amount of
credit risk. Of course, the Fed already holds assets with significant risk,
namely, longer-term Treasury securities, although in this case the risk
primarily comes from general yield curve changes rather than specific
credit exposure. One can therefore imagine the Fed shifting its portfolio
in a way that assumes greater credit risk but that does not necessarily
increase overall risk.
In summary, the declining stock of Treasury securities should not be
particularly problematic for the implementation of monetary policy. The
Fed relies on temporary operations to meet short-term changes in its
reserve needs, and it conducted such operations to address the unprece-
dented changes in reserve needs that occurred at the turn of the millen-
nium. The range of securities accepted in such operations could be
expanded beyond Treasuries, agency securities, and mortgage-backed
securities. The permanent portfolio could also be expanded to include
less liquid securities. Although the Fed may want to maintain a high
degree of liquidity in a large part of its portfolio to address anticipated
and unanticipated changes in reserve needs, its entire portfolio need not be
as liquid as Treasury securities have historically been.
As mentioned earlier, many financial institutions besides the Federal
Reserve, including foreign central banks and domestic depository institu-
tions, use U.S. Treasury securities as a reserve asset. Although Treasury
securities are a much smaller share of these institutions’ portfolios, the
paydown of the federal debt could be even more pertinent to their opera-
tions. The Fed largely relies on short-term ﬁnancing markets to meet mar-
ginal changes in reserve needs, but some of these other institutions may be
relying on the safety and liquidity of Treasury securities to meet marginal
changes in liquidity needs. Furthermore, some of these institutions may
not have access to the same investment options as the Fed because of reg-
ulatory restrictions or inadequate investment expertise.
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The paydown of the federal debt raises some valid concerns, as U.S.
Treasury securities have long been central to the implementation of mon-
etary policy and to the operation of financial markets more generally.
These securities serve as the primary asset of the Federal Reserve, as a
proxy for risk-free interest rates, as a reference for pricing other fixed-
income securities, and as a popular hedging device. Many of the attri-
butes of Treasury securities that make them so attractive are likely to be
affected by the debt paydown. Preliminary evidence suggests that the pay-
down has already contributed to higher borrowing costs in the repo market
and to lower liquidity among certain securities as well as increased idio-
syncratic price behavior.
Market participants are responding to the paydown through the con-
sideration of alternative benchmarks and reserve assets. To hedge positions
and price new issues in other ﬁxed-income markets, agency debt securities,
corporate debt securities, and interest rate swaps are increasingly being
adopted. Yields on these securities often move more closely with those of
other fixed-income securities than with Treasury yields, giving them the
potential to be better hedging and reference benchmarks. The Fed is also
taking steps toward adjusting its portfolio to respond to the diminished
supply of Treasury securities, and it should be able to make such adjust-
ments with minimal implications for monetary policy.
[Comments and discussion on this paper, as well as bibliographic refer-
ences, appear on page 285.]
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